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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
These appeals present certified questions arising from 
two actions, Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P. et al. and 
Houck v. Capital Asset Research Corp., Ltd. et al. , which 
have been consolidated before the district court for pretrial 
purposes. The subject matter of both actions concerns the 
assignment of delinquent municipal tax and utility claims 
to defendant National Tax Funding, L.P. ("NTF "). We set 
forth the relevant factual and procedural background 
below. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
For years, the City of Pittsburgh ("City"), the School 
District of Pittsburgh ("School District"), and the Pittsburgh 
Water and Sewer Authority ("PWSA") (collectively, the 
"government entities") accumulated a backlog of thousands 
of claims against homeowners who did not fully pay their 
property taxes or water or sewer bills. In order to eliminate 
this backlog, the government entities decided to sell the 
claims and the liens arising therefrom to NTF, which is in 
the business of purchasing such delinquent claims from 
municipalities in several states. App. at 135, 514. 1 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appendix references are to the appendix filed in Nos. 99-3858 and 99- 
3859. 
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September 1996, the City and the School District entered 
into a Purchase Agreement whereby existing claims and 
liens for unpaid taxes and sewer charges were assigned to 
NTF.2 App. at 517. The Purchase Agreement also called for 
the City and the School District to sell NTF subsequent 
claims for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. Under the 
agreement, the City and the School District retained the 
right to service the claims, and accordingly they entered 
into a Servicing Agreement with Capital Asset Research 
Corp., Ltd. ("CARC")3 pursuant to which CARC was to 
collect the claims for the benefit of NTF. App. at 859. The 
Servicing Agreement allowed the City and the School 
District to retain some measure of control over CARC's 
collection activities; for example, the agreement required 
CARC to make monthly reports to the City and the School 
District and it required CARC to offer homeowners 
"payment plans" having particular terms. 
 
In April 1997, NTF entered into a similar Purchase 
Agreement with PWSA involving the assignment of unpaid 
water claims. App. at 886. Like the agreement with the City 
and the School District, the PWSA Purchase Agreement 
called for the assignment of not only existing claims but 
also future claims. Under the agreement, PWSA retained 
the right to service the claims, and it entered into a 
Servicing Agreement with CARC similar to the agreement 
between CARC and the City and School District. App. at 
1099. 
 
CARC then set about contacting homeowners in order to 
collect on the delinquent claims. According to defendants, 
NTF, through CARC, has endeavored to collect from the 
homeowners the same interest and penalties on the claims 
which the government entities collect under applicable local 
law. See app. at 139, 1141, 1146, 1151, 1196, 1198, 1221- 
23. Specifically, a City ordinance provides for a twelve 
percent annual rate of interest on unpaid property taxes, 
along with a one-half percent per month penalty. App. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The sewer claims had been assigned to the City by the Allegheny 
County Sanitary Authority. 
 
3. Like NTF, CARC is a limited partnership. Both partnerships share a 
common general partner, Capital Asset Holdings GP Inc. App. at 1355. 
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1385. Another ordinance provides for a twelve percent 
annual rate of interest on claims for unpaid sewer charges 
assigned by the Allegheny County Sanitary Authority 
("ALCOSAN") to the City, along with a one-timefive percent 
penalty. App. at 1128. In addition, a PWSA resolution calls 
for interest at the rate of one-half percent per month and 
penalty at the rate of one percent per month on unpaid 
water and sewer charges. App. at 1119. At approximately 
the same time as the 1996 assignment, the City amended 
the ordinance regarding unpaid property taxes so as to 
permit interest and penalties to be compounded on a 
monthly basis. See app. at 444, 471-72, 487, 492-93, 502, 
506-07.4 
 
In response to CARC's collection efforts, some 
homeowners entered into payment plans permitting them to 
pay their debts--together with interest and penalty--over a 
period of time ranging from six to twenty-four months. 
Others paid the claims in full immediately. 
 
On April 17, 1998, Gladys Houck and others (the"Houck 
plaintiffs") filed suit against NTF, CARC and Capital Asset 
Holdings GP Inc. ("CAH"), the general partner in NFT and 
CARC, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. 
The action was removed to the district court on May 14, 
1998. App. at 49. The complaint, as amended, asserted 
claims on behalf of homeowners under the United States 
and Pennsylvania Constitutions, the Pennsylvania Second 
Class City Treasurer's Sale and Tax Collection Act, the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law ("UTP/CPL"), the Pennsylvania Loan Interest 
Protection Law ("LIPL"), the federal Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act ("FDCPA"), and the Pennsylvania Municipal 
Claims and Tax Liens Law. App. at 107-20. On May 8, 
1998, Tito Pollice and others (the "Pollice plaintiffs") filed an 
action on behalf of property owners against NTF and CARC 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Houck plaintiffs contend that "[a]t least to an extent, the rates 
and other charges imposed by Creditors [defendants] exceeded those 
which the municipal entities . . . claimed authority to charge and had in 
fact charged." See br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 
99-3859 at 9. Nevertheless, for purposes of this opinion, we will assume 
that NTF in fact has charged the same interest and penalties as the local 
ordinances and resolution authorize the government entities to charge. 
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in the district court asserting claims under the FDCPA and 
the federal Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA"), along with claims 
for unjust enrichment and fraud. App. at 79-96. The 
central allegation in both cases, as relevant to these 
appeals, is that NTF, through CARC, has collected 
unlawfully high interest and penalties on the assigned 
claims.5 We will at times refer to the Houck plaintiffs and 
the Pollice plaintiffs as "homeowners" or"plaintiffs," 
collectively, even though the Pollice class includes property 
owners who are not homeowners, and we will at times refer 
to NTF, CARC and CAH as "defendants," collectively. 
 
On July 20, 1998, the district court consolidated the 
Pollice and Houck matters for pretrial purposes. Defendants 
then moved for summary judgment on all claims in both 
actions, app. at 134-44, while the Houck plaintiffs moved 
for summary judgment on their FDCPA, UTP/CPL and LIPL 
claims.6 The district court ruled on the motions in an 
opinion and order dated July 29, 1999 and entered August 
2, 1999. See Pollice v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 59 F. 
Supp.2d 474 (W.D. Pa. 1999). Relying on the recent 
decision of the Commonwealth Court in Maierhoffer v. GLS 
Capital, Inc., 730 A.2d 547 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999), appeal 
denied, 749 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2000), the district court 
indicated that the claims and liens in fact could be 
assigned to NTF under Pennsylvania law. See Pollice, 59 F. 
Supp.2d at 477 n.3. The court further indicated that NTF, 
as assignee of the government entities, is subject to a 
statutory provision permitting the collection of interest on 
municipal tax and utility claims at a rate not to exceed ten 
percent per year. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7143. The 
court rejected the argument that the City's status as a 
home rule municipality conferred the authority to pass 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Houck action has been brought on behalf of owner-occupants of 
homes in Pittsburgh. The Pollice class is broader, involving all owners of 
real property in Pittsburgh subject to the assigned claims and liens. See 
oral arg. tr. at 5; app. at 81-82, 110. The Houck class thus is subsumed 
within the Pollice class. 
 
6. On October 30, 1998, the district court approved a partial settlement 
in the Houck action relating to plaintiffs' constitutional claims and 
their 
claim under the Second Class City Treasurer's Sale and Tax Collection 
Act. See Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 477 n.2. 
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ordinances setting higher rates on the claims. See Pollice, 
59 F. Supp.2d at 478. 
 
The court then addressed the merits of the homeowners' 
claims in light of its conclusion that NTF is subject to the 
ten percent interest cap. The court held that the Houck 
plaintiffs cannot recover excess interest paid under the LIPL 
because they have not paid interest as consideration for the 
"loan or use of money." In this regard, the court construed 
the term "use of money" in the LIPL to mean an agreement 
by a creditor to forbear from immediate action to collect a 
debt. The court indicated that the payment plans offered by 
defendants constitute such a forbearance, but it 
nevertheless concluded that those homeowners who entered 
into plans cannot recover because they have not paid any 
additional interest or penalties as consideration for this 
forbearance. See id. at 482-83. 
 
The court then turned to the FDCPA claims (raised by 
both sets of plaintiffs). Defendants argued (1) that the 
water, sewer and tax obligations do not constitute"debts" 
under the FDCPA, (2) that NTF, CAH and CARC are not 
"debt collectors," (3) that defendants have not violated the 
substantive provisions of the FDCPA, and (4) that 
defendants in any event are protected by the FDCPA's 
"bona fide error" exclusion. See id. at 484-85. The court 
dismissed the claims of both sets of plaintiffs as against 
NTF and CAH and with respect to defendants' conduct in 
collecting the tax claims. The court held that NTF and CAH 
are not "debt collectors" under the FDCPA because "they 
are not in the business of collecting debts and do not in 
fact collect debts." Id. at 486. By contrast, the court 
concluded that CARC is a "debt collector" subject to liability 
under the statute and that CARC does not fall within a 
provision exempting government officers or employees. 
Relying on our decision in Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275 
(3d Cir. 1980), the court further held that the water and 
sewer obligations constitute "debts" for purposes of the 
FDCPA but that the tax obligations do not. See Pollice, 59 
F. Supp.2d at 485. The court then indicated that CARC has 
acted in violation of the FDCPA by seeking to collect rates 
of interest and penalties for the water and sewer claims in 
excess of that authorized by state law. See id.  Finally, the 
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court found material questions of fact regarding the"bona 
fide error" defense, and it denied the Houck plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment. See id. at 486-87. 
 
With respect to the Pollice plaintiffs' TILA claim, 
defendants argued (1) that NTF and CARC are not 
"creditors" under TILA, (2) that TILA's public utility 
exemption is applicable with respect to the water and sewer 
claims, and (3) that no "consumer credit transactions" 
within the meaning of TILA ever took place. The court 
granted summary judgment in favor of CARC and 
additionally dismissed the claim with respect to defendants' 
conduct relating to the tax obligations. The court indicated 
that NTF acted as a "creditor" under TILA by entering into 
payment plans with homeowners, but it concluded that 
CARC is not a "creditor" because "it is merely an agent, 
rather than the entity to which the debts are payable." Id. 
at 488 n.14. Influenced again by Staub, the court indicated 
that the payment plans constitute "consumer credit 
transactions" under TILA, but only with respect to the 
water and sewer claims and not the tax claims. See id. at 
490-91. The court further held that TILA's public utility 
exemption is inapplicable. See id. at 489-90. 
 
Finally, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants with respect to the Pollice plaintiffs' 
unjust enrichment claim. In the district court's view, this 
claim is "largely dependant on the argument that the 
original owners of the liens and claims [the government 
entities] could not assign their right to charge higher 
interest and penalties to National Tax." Id.  at 491. The 
court rejected this argument in light of Maierhoffer, and 
thus it dismissed the unjust enrichment claim.7 See id. 
 
The Pollice and Houck plaintiffs subsequently moved to 
alter or amend the July 29, 1999 judgment, but the district 
court denied their motions in orders dated September 20, 
1999 and entered September 21, 1999. The district court 
then modified the July 29 and September 20 orders to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In addition, the court dismissed the Houck plaintiffs' UTP/CPL claim 
and the Pollice plaintiffs' fraud claim. These rulings are not challenged 
on appeal. 
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certify various questions for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). We granted petitions for permission to appeal. 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over both actions 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1292(b). " `As the text of S 1292(b) indicates, appellate 
jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of 
appeals, and is not tied to the particular question 
formulated by the district court.' " Abdullah v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 
S.Ct. 619, 623 (1996)). We may address "any issue fairly 
included within the certified order because it is the order 
that is appealable, and not the controlling question 
identified by the district court." Id. (citation omitted). Our 
standard of review in this appeal involving only questions of 
law is plenary. Id. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. State Law Issues 
 
We are called upon to determine whether the district 
court erred in its disposition of the LIPL and unjust 
enrichment claims. Before doing so, we must address two 
preliminary questions of Pennsylvania law: (1) the 
assignability of governmental rights relating to tax and 
utility claims and liens, and (2) the applicability of the ten 
percent interest provision under Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, 
S 7143. 
 
1. Assignability 
 
Homeowners argue that governmental rights relating to 
tax and utility claims and liens may not be assigned to 
private entities under Pennsylvania law. As the district 
court correctly noted, however, the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court recently held that municipal claims 
and the liens arising therefrom are assignable to private 
entities under a provision of the Municipal Claims and Tax 
Liens Law, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7147. See Maierhoffer, 
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730 A.2d at 549-51 ("[U]nder [section 7147], a municipality 
may assign any claim, tax or municipal, to a party that is 
a stranger to the original transaction . . . ."). Section 7147 
provides in pertinent part: 
 
       Any claim filed or to be filed, under the provisions of 
       this act, and any judgment recovered thereon, may be 
       assigned or transferred to a third party, either 
       absolutely or as collateral security, and such assignee 
       shall have all the rights of the original holder thereof.8 
 
Homeowners argue that Maierhoffer is contrary to prior 
decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and therefore 
we should not follow it. In addition, they request that we 
certify this issue to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court, however, denied a petition for allowance of 
appeal in Maierhoffer on January 20, 2000. See 749 A.2d 
473 (Pa. 2000). Accordingly, we believe that the Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The term "tax claim" is defined as"the claim filed to recover taxes." 
Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7101. The term "municipal claim" is defined as 
follows: 
 
       (1) the claim arising out of, or resulting from, a tax assessed, 
service 
       supplied, work done, or improvement authorized and undertaken, by 
       a municipality, although the amount thereof be not at the time 
       definitely ascertained by the authority authorized to determine the 
       same, and a lien therefor be not filed, but becomes filable within 
the 
       period and in the manner herein provided, (2) the claim filed to 
       recover for the grading, guttering, macadamizing, or otherwise 
       improving, the cartways of any public highway; for grading, 
curbing, 
       recurbing, paving, repaving, constructing, or repairing the 
footways 
       thereof; for laying water pipes, gas pipes, culverts, sewers, 
branch 
       sewers, or sewer connections therein; for assessment for benefits 
in 
       the opening, widening or vacation thereof; or in the changing of 
       water-courses or the construction of sewers through private lands; 
       or in the highways of townships of the first class; or in the 
       acquisition of sewers and drains constructed and owned by 
       individuals or corporations, and of rights in and to use the same; 
for 
       the removal of nuisances; or for water rates, lighting rates, or 
sewer 
       rates, and (3) the claim filed to recover for work, material, and 
       services rendered or furnished in the construction, improvement, 
       maintenance, and operation of a project or projects of a body 
politic 
       or corporate created as a Municipal Authority pursuant to law. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) 
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Court would not accept certification of this issue and thus 
we will not certify the question and delay these proceedings.9 
We have reviewed Maierhoffer carefully and have concluded 
that it was decided correctly. Thus, we follow Maierhoffer in 
concluding that the government entities had the power to 
assign their rights relating to the tax, water and sewer 
claims and liens to NTF, and that NTF as assignee thereby 
stands in the shoes of the government entities with respect 
to these claims and liens. Therefore, NTF is entitled to 
collect interest and penalties on the assigned claims to the 
same extent as the government entities are entitled under 
relevant state and local law. 
 
2. Applicability of ten percent interest provision 
 
Homeowners contend that the combined interest and 
penalty charges imposed by NTF on the assigned claims are 
unlawful under the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Law. 
Section 7143 which is a provision of that law reads in 
pertinent part: 
 
       Interest as determined by the municipality at a rate not 
       to exceed ten per cent per annum shall be collectible on 
       all municipal claims from the date of the completion of 
       the work after it is filed as a lien, and on claims for 
       taxes, water rents or rates, lighting rates, or sewer 
       rates from the date of the filing of the lien therefor. 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7143 (emphasis added).10 
 
Like the district court, we conclude that NTF, as assignee 
of claims belonging to the government entities, is subject to 
section 7143. The plain language of section 7143 permits 
the collection of interest on a municipality's claim for taxes, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The decision to allow an appeal from the Commonwealth Court -- like 
the decision to accept a certification petition from a federal court -- is 
a 
matter of the Supreme Court's discretion. See  Pa. R. App. P. 1114. 
 
10. The term "taxes" is defined as "any county, city, borough, 
incorporated town, township, school, bridge, road, or poor taxes." Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7101. The term "municipality" is defined as "any 
county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, 
county institution district, and a body politic and corporate created as a 
Municipal Authority pursuant to law." Id. 
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water rents or rates, or sewer rates,11  but the rate is limited 
to ten percent per annum. The term "municipality" includes 
not only cities, but also school districts and municipal 
authorities. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53,S 7101. Thus, NTF, 
as assignee of the City, the School District, and the PWSA, 
is entitled to collect interest on the assigned claims up to 
this ten percent cap. See Horbal v. Moxham Nat'l Bank, 697 
A.2d 577, 583 (Pa. 1997) ("Under the law of assignment, 
the assignee succeeds to no greater rights than those 
possessed by the assignor."). There can be no dispute that 
NTF has exceeded the cap. 
 
Defendants argue that the City, as a home rule 
municipality, acted within its power in passing the 
ordinances setting the interest and penalty rates at issue 
here. Yet, it is clear that under the Home Rule Charter and 
Optional Plans Law (the "Home Rule Law") a home rule 
municipality may not act in contravention of state laws 
applicable to municipalities. Under the Home Rule Law, "[a] 
municipality which has adopted a home rule charter may 
exercise any powers and perform any function not denied 
by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, by statute or by its 
home rule charter." 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2961. 
Further, the Home Rule Law provides that, "[w]ith respect 
to the following subjects, the home rule charter shall not 
give any power or authority to the municipality contrary to, 
or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In City of Philadelphia v. Holley, 220 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966), 
the court construed the term "rents or rates" as used in section 7143: 
 
        The words `rents or rates' are not defined by the act and must be 
       given their plain everyday meaning. Webster's Third New 
       International Dictionary defines a `rate' as`a charge per unit of a 
       public-service commodity (as electricity, gas, water)', and defines 
       `water rate' or `water rent' as `a rate or tax for supply of 
water'. To 
       the average householder, his water rent or rate means either a flat 
       charge for the water furnished him or a charge for each unit of 
       water coming into his home. He understands his gas and electric 
       rate the same way. Our Supreme Court gave judicial approval to 
       this general usage in Jolly v. Monaca Borough , 216 Pa. 345, 65 A. 
       809 (1907), where the court defined a water rate as the price paid 
       for water as a commodity. 
 
Id. at 398 (citations omitted). 
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statutes which are applicable to a class or classes of 
municipalities"; among the listed subjects is"[t]he filing and 
collection of municipal tax claims or liens and the sale of 
real or personal property in satisfaction of them." 53 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2962(a)(1). Clearly, the assessment of 
interest and penalties on delinquent tax obligations falls 
within the scope of "collection of municipal tax claims." 
Another provision of the Home Rule Law states that"[a] 
municipality shall not . . . [e]xercise powers contrary to, or 
in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by statutes 
which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth." 
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2962(c)(2). Based on the clear 
language of the Home Rule Law, we conclude that a home 
rule municipality may not exceed the ten percent interest 
limit set forth in section 7143. 
 
Defendants argue that the interest and penalty rates set 
by the City with respect to the tax claims are lawful under 
the following provision of the Home Rule Law: 
 
       Establishment of rates of taxation.--No provision of 
       this subpart or any other statute shall limit a 
       municipality which adopts a home rule charter from 
       establishing its own rates of taxation upon all 
       authorized subjects of taxation . . . . 
 
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2962(i).12  Defendants contend 
that "rate of taxation" includes the rate of interest and 
penalties on delinquent tax obligations. Plaintiffs respond 
that "establishing the rate of taxation is not the same as 
assessing a rate of interest on an already delinquent tax." 
See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3856 
and 99-3857 at 15. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Home Rule Law defines "rate of taxation" as "[t]he amount of tax 
levied by a municipality on a permissible subject of taxation." 53 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2902. "Subject of taxation" is defined as follows: 
 
       Any person, business, corporation, partnership, entity, real 
       property, . . . personal property, property interest, transaction, 
       occurrence, privilege, transfer, occupation or any other levy which 
is 
       determined to be taxable by the General Assembly. The term shall 
       not be construed to mean the rate of tax which may be imposed on 
       a permissible subject of taxation. 
 
Id. 
 
                                14 
  
Like the district court, we agree with plaintiffs that a 
home rule municipality's authority to set "rates of taxation" 
does not include the authority to set interest and penalty 
rates on delinquent taxes. "Rate of taxation" undoubtedly 
means the rate which is applied to the value of property in 
order to determine the amount of the tax owed; its plain 
meaning does not include the rate of interest or penalty on 
overdue tax obligations. The rate of interest on tax 
obligations is directly governed by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, 
S 7143, which expressly limits "[i]nterest" on "claims for 
taxes." 
 
Finally, defendants argue that the interest and penalty 
rates on water and sewer claims set by the PWSA resolution 
do not violate section 7143 because the annual rate of 
"interest" under the resolution is less than ten percent. As 
stated, under the resolution, the "interest" charge is one- 
half percent per month while the "penalty" charge is one 
percent per month. App. at 1119. Defendants argue that 
section 7143 by its terms limits only the rate of"interest" 
and not the rate of "penalty."13  The district court rejected 
defendants' argument, finding that "this distinction 
[between interest and penalty] rings hollow when applied to 
the instant set of facts." Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 479. The 
court stated that no municipality "may evade the 
requirements of the Municipal Claims Act [section 7143] by 
converting interest in excess of that which is statutorily 
authorized to a `penalty.' " Id. We agree with the district 
court's reasoning. There appears to be no actual distinction 
between the monthly "interest" charge and the monthly 
"penalty" charge under the PWSA resolution; indeed, there 
would be no practical difference if the one percent"penalty" 
rate were labeled an "interest" rate and the one-half percent 
"interest" rate were labeled a "penalty" rate. 
 
In attempting to draw a valid distinction between 
"interest" and "penalty," defendants argue that the former 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This argument is applicable only to the rates set by the PWSA 
resolution. Under the City ordinances applicable to unpaid property 
taxes and unpaid sewer claims assigned to the City by ALCOSAN, the 
rate of "interest" is twelve percent annually, leaving aside the 
"penalty." 
See app. at 1128, 1385. 
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"compensates the government for the lost time-value" of 
unpaid obligations, while the latter "does not necessarily 
compensate the government for the lost value of money, 
and generally imposes an added cost on the delinquent 
party as punishment for noncompliance with the law." Br. 
of appellees in No. 99-3998 at 40-41. We, however,find this 
distinction to be artificial and thus we agree with the 
district court that a municipality should not be permitted to 
avoid the ten percent limit by arbitrarily labeling some 
portion of the monthly charge as "penalty" rather than 
"interest." 
 
In sum, we conclude that NTF, as assignee of the 
government entities, is subject to section 7143 and that it 
has violated that provision by imposing interest charges on 
the assigned claims in excess of ten percent per annum. 
 
3. The LIPL claim 
 
Homeowners seek relief under the Loan Interest 
Protection Law ("LIPL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 101 et seq.14 
Under that law, "the maximum lawful rate of interest for 
the loan or use of money in an amount of fifty thousand 
dollars ($50,000) or less in all cases where no express 
contract shall have been made for a less rate shall be six 
per cent per annum." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41,S 201. The law 
further provides that "[i]f any maximum lawful rate of 
interest provided for in this act is inconsistent with the 
provision of any other act establishing, permitting or 
removing a maximum interest rate . . . then the provision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. In Appeal No. 99-4049, the Pollice plaintiffs present arguments 
regarding the LIPL. Yet, at the time of the district court's July 29, 1999 
ruling on the motions for summary judgment, only the Houck plaintiffs 
had asserted a claim under the LIPL. The Pollice plaintiffs later amended 
their complaint to add such a claim, but the district court never made 
any disposition of the Pollice plaintiffs' claim. Defendants contend that 
we lack jurisdiction to hear the Pollice plaintiffs' arguments regarding 
the LIPL because the certified orders did not address their LIPL claim. 
We agree that we lack jurisdiction to make any ruling regarding the 
Pollice plaintiffs' LIPL claim. See Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 
852 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1988) (jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) 
is "limited to a review of the order of the district court"). 
Nevertheless, in 
the course of our discussion of the LIPL, we will consider some of the 
points raised in the Pollice plaintiffs' briefs. 
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of such other act shall prevail." Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 604. 
The LIPL provides a cause of action to recover usurious 
interest: 
 
       A person who has paid a rate of interest for the loan or 
       use of money at a rate in excess of that provided for by 
       this act or otherwise by law or has paid charges  
       prohibited or in excess of those allowed by this act or 
       otherwise by law may recover triple the amount of such 
       excess interest or charges in a suit at law against the 
       person who has collected such excess interest or 
       charges . . . . 
 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 502 (emphasis added). Homeowners 
argue that they have "paid [to NTF] a rate of interest for the 
loan or use of money . . . in excess of that provided for . . . 
otherwise by law" because the interest and penalty rates 
exceeded the ten percent limit of Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, 
S 7143. Alternatively, homeowners argue that they have 
"paid charges prohibited or in excess of those allowed . . . 
otherwise by law." 
 
As set forth in the preceding section, we agree with 
plaintiffs' contention that NTF has charged interest and 
penalties at a rate in excess of the ten percent permitted by 
section 7143. The district court nevertheless held that 
homeowners cannot recover under the LIPL because they 
have not paid the interest and penalties as consideration 
"for the loan or use of money." In this regard, the district 
court recognized a distinction between, on the one hand, 
charges imposed on account of a debtor's failure to make 
timely payment of money when due ("detention"), and on 
the other, money received by a creditor as consideration for 
agreeing to refrain from immediately collecting a debt 
("forbearance"). Relying largely on cases construing usury 
statutes from other jurisdictions, the district court 
indicated that only in the latter situation has there been a 
"use of money" under the LIPL. The court then indicated 
that no forbearance occurred here until NTF, through 
CARC, entered into payment plans with some of the 
homeowners. See Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 482 ("[T]he 
terms provided in the payment plans should be read as 
constituting a forbearance under the Pennsylvania usury 
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law. A forbearance is widely considered a `use of money' for 
the purposes of usury law."). 
 
The district court further concluded, however, that even 
those homeowners who have entered into payment plans 
cannot recover under the LIPL. The court reasoned as 
follows: 
 
       [W]e believe that an interest rate beyond that allowed 
       by law can only be considered usurious if it exists as 
       consideration for the creditor's forbearance. 
 
        While it has been established that the interest rate 
       charged by defendants is beyond that allowed under 
       Pennsylvania law, and that defendants, through the 
       payment plans, are forbearing on collecting the money 
       owed, it has not been shown that the rate being 
       charged is in any way consideration for this 
       forbearance. The facts presented illustrate that 
       defendants have received no additional consideration in 
       return for the terms offered under the payment plans. 
       The interest rate charged for late payment is not 
       consideration for the payment plans, but a part of the 
       consideration for the original transaction. 
 
        Further, defendants are not charging plaintiffs a rate 
       for participating in the plans which is higher than 
       plaintiffs would be charged if they did not participate. 
       This is therefore not the typical forbearance situation, 
       in which the debtor could not pay his or her obligation 
       upon its due date and the creditor agreed to extend the 
       period of repayment of the debt for additional 
       consideration. 
 
        Thus, the facts of this case preclude us fromfinding 
       that defendants, by offering the payment plans and 
       thus forbearing on the immediate collection of the debt 
       owed, modified the original transaction so as to bring 
       it within the ambit of the Pennsylvania Loan Interest 
       Protection Law. 
 
Id. at 483 (citations omitted). 
 
Pennsylvania courts have not specifically addressed 
whether there has been a "loan or use of money" under the 
LIPL in the detention context. Several cases from other 
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jurisdictions indicate that usury laws apply only when a 
creditor agrees to take interest in exchange for making a 
loan or promising to forbear from the immediate collection 
of a debt; there is no usury when a creditor simply charges 
a debtor for failure to make timely payment of a debt when 
due. For example, in Smith Machinery Co. v. Jenkins, 654 
F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1981), the court considered a 
promissory note which called for interest at the rate of 
twelve percent to accrue after maturity. Id. at 694. 
Reasoning as follows, the court held that the New Mexico 
usury statute was inapplicable to such postmaturity 
charges: 
 
        In the absence of language in the usury statutes that 
       compels a different conclusion, the courts have 
       generally held the limitations on interest rates charged 
       do not apply to postmaturity charges. The rationale is 
       that because postmaturity charges are within the 
       debtor's control they are penalties for nonpayment 
       rather than charges for the use of money and, 
       therefore, they are not affected by usury laws. Such 
       charges may be deemed usurious, however, when state 
       laws limit interest rates which can be applied on the 
       `detention' as well as the use of money. 
 
        N.M.Stat.Ann. S 56-8-9 A (1978) indicates the scope 
       of coverage of the usury limits of the New Mexico 
       provisions cited above. [The statute provides:] `(N)o 
       person, corporation or association, directly or 
       indirectly, shall take, reserve, receive or charge any 
       interest, discount or other advantage for the loan of 
       money or credit or the forbearance or postponement of 
       the right to receive money or credit except at the rates 
       permitted in Sections 56-8-1 through 56-8-21 NMSA 
       1978.' 
 
        All the terms of the statute denote consensual 
       agreements between the parties, indicating that a 
       withholding or detention by the borrower not consented 
       to by the lender is not within the statute's purview. The 
       mere fact that the parties have agreed to the rate to be 
       paid after the debt is due does not make an 
       arrangement a forbearance. In the instant case there 
       was no agreement that [the debtor] could defer 
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       payment after maturity; the situation was a `detention' 
       of money rather than a `forbearance' and, as such, we 
       do not think the New Mexico courts would hold it is 
       covered by the statute. 
 
Id. at 696 (citations and footnote omitted); see also 
Scientific Prods. v. Cyto Med. Lab., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1373, 
1379 (D. Conn. 1978) ("[I]t does not necessarily follow that 
charges at a rate in excess of that prohibited at the 
inception of a loan are usurious when imposed only on the 
unpaid balance after the loan has matured . . . . Here there 
was no agreement that the [debtor] could defer payment. 
Many cases have held that since charges of this nature are 
within the borrower's control, they are penalties for non- 
payment, rather than charges for the use of money, and, 
therefore, not affected by the usury laws."); Rangen, Inc. v. 
Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955, 960 (Idaho 1983) 
("[The creditor] was imposing a late charge on accounts in 
arrears . . . . [W]e agree that the usury laws are 
inapplicable to this type of transaction. The charge was a 
valid late charge which could have been avoided if[the 
debtor] had paid its account when due. There was neither 
an express or an implied agreement to forbear or extend the 
time for payment."); Widmark v. Northrup King Co., 530 
N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("[W]e conclude that 
the `late charges' assessed by [the creditor] did not 
constitute a usurious rate of interest. [The creditor] never 
actually agreed to forego an immediate action on[the 
debtor's] account if it became overdue in exchange for a late 
charge. Unlike typical credit arrangements, [the creditor] 
did not encourage late payments in order to recover the 
additional charge . . . . Consequently, we hold that there 
was no forbearance here within the meaning of the usury 
laws."); see also 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury S 122 (1982) 
("[Usury statutes] apply only to those contracts which in 
substance involve a loan of money or forbearance to collect 
money due, and so, where there is no loan or forbearance, 
there can be no usury . . . . A charge imposed because of 
the late payment of a debt comes within the definition of 
interest under a usury statute only where it is paid as 
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consideration for the creditor's forbearance of asserting his 
right of collection.").15 
 
Of course, cases from other jurisdictions are not 
controlling with respect to the meaning of a Pennsylvania 
statute. Nevertheless, in the absence of Pennsylvania case 
law directly on point, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would follow the approach taken by these 
other courts. The phrase "paid a rate of interest for the loan 
or use of money" under section 502 of the LIPL implies that 
there is some consensual arrangement between the parties; 
that is, an agreement by the lender or creditor to make a 
loan, or to grant the debtor the "use" of money by 
promising to forebear from taking immediate action to 
collect a debt, in exchange for interest. We believe there has 
been no "loan or use of money" under section 502 when a 
debtor simply detains money which the creditor wishes to 
receive immediately. 
 
In re Kenin's Trust Estate, 23 A.2d 837 (Pa. 1942), 
supports our conclusion. In that case, a trustee failed to 
make proper delivery of trust proceeds. The Supreme Court 
addressed the question whether "damages for the[trustee's] 
detention of funds" should be measured by the legal rate of 
interest set forth in the Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622, a 
predecessor to the current LIPL. Id. at 844. As paraphrased 
by the court, P.L. 622 "fix[ed] at 6% the lawful rate of 
interest for the loan or use of money, in all cases where no 
express contract shall have been made for a less rate." Id. 
at 844 n.4. The court indicated that the statute was 
inapplicable, and instead held that damages should be 
measured by "what the money so detained would have 
produced if it had been delivered to those entitled to it." See 
id. at 844-45. The court commented as follows: 
 
       The Act of May 28, 1858, P.L. 622 . . . does not rule 
       the question of `damages for detention'. The word `use' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Of course, there may be other limits on a creditor's ability to 
collect 
charges for detention. For example, a provision in an agreement calling 
for unduly high late payment charges may be unenforceable as a penalty 
under general liquidated damages principles. See Rangen, 658 P.2d at 
958, 963. The sole question before us here is whether the usury law is 
applicable in the detention situation. 
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       when referring to money is often employed as a 
       synonym for `loan'. Money is not `used' within the 
       meaning of this act when it is detained under the 
       circumstances here present. 
 
Id. at 844 n.4 (emphasis added).16  
 
Homeowners present a somewhat complex argument in 
an attempt to demonstrate that Kenin is not controlling 
here. They point out that Pennsylvania law draws a 
distinction between (1) "interest as such or interest eo 
nomine," which is recoverable "when afixed sum is due 
from a date certain," and (2) "damages for detention or 
delay," which are recoverable "when the amount or onset of 
the obligation is not certain." Reply br. of appellants/cross- 
appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 8; see American 
Enka Co. v. Wicaco Mach. Corp., 686 F.2d 1050, 1056-57 
(3d Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Crown Fin. Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 
292-95 (3d Cir. 1981); Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld 
Div. of the Fort Pitt Div. of Spang Indus., Inc., 498 A.2d 895, 
898-901 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); 20 Pennsylvania Law 
Encyclopedia Interest and Usury SS 4, 6-8 (1990). In the 
former situation--where there has been a failure to pay a 
fixed or liquidated sum due on a certain date--the party to 
whom the sum is owed may as a matter of right recover 
prejudgment interest at the legal rate of six percent running 
from the date the sum is due. See American Enka , 686 F.2d 
at 1056-57; Peterson, 661 F.2d at 293; Miller v. City of 
Reading, 87 A.2d 223, 225 (Pa. 1952) ("[I]t is the law of 
Pennsylvania that a debtor who defaults in the payment of 
the principal of an obligation when due and payable 
becomes liable for interest from the date of such default at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. A statement in another Pennsylvania decision supports the 
conclusion that the Pennsylvania usury statute applies only where there 
has been a loan or a forbearance. See Equipment Fin., Inc. v. Grannas, 
218 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966) ("[T]he law seems to be settled 
that usury can only attach to a loan of money or to the forbearance of 
a debt . . . .") (citation omitted); see also  20 Pennsylvania Law 
Encyclopedia Interest and Usury S 22 (1990) ("Usury contemplates the 
existence of a loan, and when there is no loan, usury cannot arise."). 
Although Grannas addressed the LIPL's predecessor statute, that statute 
--like the current LIPL--contained the "loan or use of money" 
requirement. 
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the legal rate of 6% per annum until payment is made, 
irrespective of the rate prescribed in the obligation itself for 
the period prior to maturity . . . . [I]n the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary, a liquidated claim carries 
interest at the legal rate from the time the debt becomes 
due."); Daset Mining Corp. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 473 
A.2d 584, 594-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("In claims that 
arise out of a contractual right, interest has been allowed at 
the legal rate from the date that payment was wrongfully 
withheld, where the damages are liquidated and certain, 
and the interest is readily ascertainable through 
computation."); see also Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 202 (setting 
the "legal rate of interest" at six percent per annum). In the 
latter situation--where the breach involves something other 
than an obligation to pay a liquidated sum on a certain 
date--recovery of delay damages "will not be a matter of 
right, . . . [but] will be an issue for thefinder of fact, the 
resolution of which depends upon all the circumstances of 
the case." Frank B. Bozzo, 498 A.2d at 900 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
According to the homeowners, there has been a "use of 
money" under the LIPL when money is detained in the 
former situation; that is, prejudgment interest is due for the 
debtor's "use of the liquidated amount due the creditors 
from the date due." Reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees 
in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 8. Homeowners contend 
that this case falls into the former category, i.e., interest as 
such, because it involves their failure to pay liquidated 
sums for tax, water and sewer obligations which were due 
on a certain date; they further contend that interest is 
recoverable but only at the legal rate of six percent per 
annum unless otherwise permitted by law. They argue that 
Kenin falls under the latter category, i.e. , damages for 
detention or delay, and therefore is not applicable here. 
 
Despite the homeowners' argument, we adhere to our 
belief that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold 
that there has been no "loan or use of money" within the 
meaning of Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 502 in the absence of a 
loan or an agreement by the creditor to forbear. Plaintiffs' 
argument revolves around the concepts of prejudgment 
interest and damages for delay, both of which are awarded 
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by a court to compensate a prevailing party for the lost 
time-value of money running from the date of the opposing 
party's breach of contract or breach of duty. See American 
Enka, 686 F.2d at 1056 ("Common law pre-judgment 
interest is based on the principle of compensation and the 
understanding that a plaintiff wrongfully deprived of a sum 
of money is not made whole unless the delay in recovery is 
accounted for."). We are not concerned here, however, with 
the proper amount of prejudgment interest which 
defendants might be awarded by a court. Rather, we are 
called upon to address whether homeowners may employ 
section 502 to recover interest and penalties already paid to 
NTF. We believe they cannot in the absence of a loan or a 
forbearance. Further, we note that case law indicates that 
a creditor may collect interest at a rate higher  than six 
percent in situations involving the failure to pay a 
liquidated sum, if the parties have agreed to such higher 
rate. See Miller, 87 A.2d at 225-26; Daset Mining, 473 A.2d 
at 595. If such agreements are permitted, then it is 
apparent that there has been no "use of money" within the 
meaning of sections 201 and 502 of the LIPL--otherwise, 
such agreements would be usurious. 
 
We further agree with the district court's conclusion that 
the payment plans constitute a forbearance giving rise to 
the "use of money" for purposes of the LIPL. See 47 C.J.S. 
Interest & Usury S 131 (1982) ("The forbearance, or giving 
time for the payment, of a debt is, in substance, a loan, and 
when there is an existing and matured debt, a charge made 
by the creditor for his binding promise to forbear for a 
definite period to collect it, greater than that allowed by 
law, will subject the debt forborne to all the penalties 
prescribed by the law for usury."). A letter from CARC to 
the Pollices stated as follows with regard to the payment 
plans: 
 
       The full amount of the [assigned] Claims is due 
       immediately. Please make your check payable to 
       National City Bank of Pennsylvania as custodian for 
       NTF . . . . 
 
       In the event you are currently unable to satisfy this 
       obligation in full, you may pay the Claims over a longer 
       period of time in accordance with the installment 
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       purchase payment plan (the "Payment Program") . . . . 
       The longer you wait to pay the Claims, the more you 
       accumulate in additional interest, penalties, filing fees 
       and costs (including attorney's fees). Interest and 
       penalties are added to the total amount of the Claims 
       at a rate, not to exceed, 1.5% per month (compounded 
       monthly). 
 
       There are two different payment plans, 1) Water[and] 
       2) City, School and Sewer. Under the Payment 
       Program(s), you may choose to pay the Claims over 
       time in monthly installments . . . . Payments will be 
       calculated to ensure that the full amount of the 
       Claims, plus all interest, penalties and costs, will be 
       paid in full with the last payment you agree to make 
       . . . . 
 
       . . . If you successfully complete the Payment Program, 
       and the total amount of Claims, plus all acquired[sic] 
       interest, penalties and costs are paid in full, the liens 
       securing Claims against the Property will be removed 
       and marked satisfied. If you default under the Payment 
       Program, the money you have previously paid will not 
       be returned, but will instead be applied against the 
       Claims . . . . 
 
App. at 97. A payment plan enrollment form included with 
the letter provided as follows: 
 
       I understand that if I do default in the payment of 
       installments as provided above . . . all payments that 
       I have made under the Payment Program will be 
       applied pro rata to the principal, interest and penalty 
       due on the claims and thereafter NTF or agents may 
       take legal action against me or the Property to satisfy 
       the outstanding amounts owed on the Claims . . . . 
 
App. at 98. Thus, by virtue of the payment plans, NTF has 
agreed to forbear from taking immediate action to collect on 
the assigned claims.17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. It is evident that no forbearance occurred prior to the payment plans; 
prior to the plans, neither the government entities nor defendants had 
granted homeowners any right to defer payment of their debt. The fact 
that the government entities sat idle for periods of time without taking 
any action with respect to the claims does not mean that there was a 
forbearance. 
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The district court concluded, however, that "an interest 
rate beyond that allowed by law can only be considered 
usurious if it exists as consideration for the creditor's 
forbearance." Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 483 (emphasis 
added). The court stated that "it has not been shown that 
the rate being charged is in any way consideration for this 
forbearance" because "defendants are not charging 
plaintiffs a rate for participating in the plans which is 
higher than plaintiffs would be charged if they did not 
participate." Id. We agree with the district court. " `Usury' 
has been variously defined as contracting for or reserving 
something in excess of the amount allowed by law for the 
forbearance of money, the exaction of more than lawful 
interest in exchange for the loan or use of money, directly 
or indirectly, and as an excessive charge for the loan or 
forbearance of money." 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury S 4 
(1982). Thus, "[i]n general, the elements of usury consist of 
an unlawful intent, money or its equivalent, a loan or 
forbearance, an understanding that the loan shall or may 
be returned, and the exaction for the use of the loan of 
something in excess of what is allowed by law." Id. S 119. 
 
Here, no price in the form of heightened interest or 
penalties has been extracted or charged in exchange for the 
right to enter into a payment plan--rather, it appears 
undisputed that those homeowners who have entered into 
payment plans have been charged the same interest and 
penalty rates as those who did not enter into a plan. See 
br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99- 
3859 at 9, 28-30; substituted br. of appellants/cross- 
appellees in No. 99-4049 at 7. Thus, NTF simply has 
continued to collect what it would have sought to collect 
had the homeowners not entered into payment plans."The 
prime purpose of [usury] statutes is the protection of weak 
and needy borrowers from extortion and outrageous 
demands of unscrupulous lenders who are ready to take 
undue advantage of the necessities of others . . . ." 47 
C.J.S. Interest & Usury S 88 (1982). Here, NTF has made no 
"outrageous demands" for additional interest or penalties in 
exchange for agreeing to forbear. Accordingly, the purposes 
of the usury law are not implicated.18  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Homeowners argue that "[i]t is inconceivable that the legislature 
could have intended to protect debtors who agree to pay an excessive 
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Homeowners contend that NTF has received 
consideration that is non-monetary in form; specifically, 
they assert that the payment plans require homeowners to 
agree to be personally liable for the delinquent obligations 
and to be liable for attorneys' fees. Homeowners argue that 
usurious "interest" can "take many forms other than 
money." Substituted br. of appellants/cross-appellees in 
No. 99-4049 at 33. They argue that "collateral 
consideration for a forbearance, in addition to the interest 
rate itself, should be taken into account" and that 
"requiring a personal obligation as a consideration for a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
interest rate in return for forbearance, but only if this excessive rate 
was 
not already being charged them." They contend that, "[b]ased on the 
District Court's holding, . . . no sophisticated creditor would fail to 
unilaterally impose excessive interest pre-forbearance agreement, if only 
to avoid a usury claim." Reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 
99-3858 and 99-3859 at 13-14. As we have indicated, sections 201 and 
502 of the LIPL do not apply to charges which are imposed for a debtor's 
detention of money owed. If a creditor who collects such charges for 
detention subsequently agrees to forbear without imposing greater 
charges, then the post-forbearance charges are still in effect charges for 
detention, and the forbearance has not changed the relationship so far 
as the usury law is concerned. The situation is fundamentally different 
where a new or higher rate is charged in connection with the 
forbearance. 
 
In essence, those homeowners who made the decision to enroll in 
payment plans found themselves in the same position with regard to the 
payment of interest and penalties as homeowners who did not. It 
appears that the payment plans do not prohibit homeowners from paying 
their debts ahead of the schedule set forth in the plans. Thus, like those 
homeowners who did not enter into plans, those who did could pay their 
debts immediately and thus avoid the accrual of additional interest and 
penalties; alternatively, both sets of homeowners could choose to delay 
full payment of their debts and thereby accrue interest and penalties at 
the same rate. The primary difference between the two sets of 
homeowners lies in NTF 's promise to forbear from immediate action on 
the liens--those who entered into payment plans could claim the comfort 
of NTF 's forbearance, while those who did not ran the risk of losing 
their 
homes if they did not pay the claims in full immediately. Under these 
circumstances, we do not believe that one set of homeowners should 
have an LIPL claim in relation to the interest and penalty charges while 
the other does not. 
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loan, may be sufficient additional consideration when 
added to interest, to exceed the maximum allowable rate." 
Substitute reply br. of appellants in No. 99-4049 at 24. 
 
We do not question the proposition that non-monetary as 
well as monetary consideration may be taken into account 
in determining if a creditor has extracted an unlawful 
amount of value in return for a loan or a forbearance. See 
47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury S 154 (1982) ("Usury may be 
paid and received in property as well as in money. In order 
to determine whether the interest received by a lender, in 
the form of property, is usurious, the medium of payment 
is reduced to its equivalent in dollars . . . and if the value 
of the medium when so ascertained is more than the lawful 
rate on the debt or obligation on which the interest is paid, 
it amounts to the collection of usury."); see also Hartranft 
v. Uhlinger, 8 A. 244, 246 (Pa. 1887) ("It is, indeed, wholly 
immaterial under what form or pretense usury is concealed, 
if it can by any means be discovered, our courts will refuse 
to enforce its payment."); Smith v. Smith, 45 Pa. Super. 353 
(1911) (indicating that usury law was applicable where "the 
defendant [borrower], in consideration of the loan, agreed to 
give to the plaintiff [lender] something more than the 
interest fixed by law as the compensation due to the 
plaintiff, to wit, four atlases."). We believe, however, that 
the usury analysis should take into account only those 
items (be they monetary or non-monetary in form) which 
actually are paid as consideration for the loan or 
forbearance. We have concluded that the interest and 
penalties paid by those who entered into payment plans 
have not been paid as consideration for NTF 's forbearance; 
thus, the interest and penalties should not be considered in 
the usury analysis, regardless of the fact that other things 
of value (such as personal liability or liability for attorneys' 
fees) may have been given as consideration.19 Therefore, we 
reject the position that Judge Oberdorfer takes in his 
partial dissent. 
 
In sum, we conclude that homeowners (including those 
who entered into payment plans) have not "paid a rate of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We note that defendants dispute that the payment plans give rise to 
personal liability or liability for attorney's fees. 
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interest for the loan or use of money" under Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 41, S 502 when paying the interest and penalties at 
issue. Homeowners argue that they are nevertheless 
entitled to recover under section 502 because they have 
"paid charges prohibited or in excess of those allowed . . . 
otherwise by law." We reject this argument. The term 
"charges" in section 502 must refer to something other than 
"interest," as the word "interest" is listed in section 502 
separately from the word "charges." See  section 502 ("A 
person who has paid a rate of interest for the loan or use 
of money . . . or has paid charges .. . may recover triple the 
amount of such excess interest or charges . . . ."). 
Homeowners have paid "interest," but such interest has not 
been paid "for the loan or use of money." See br. of 
appellees in No. 99-4049 at 38-39. If we were to read 
"charges" to include interest that is not paid"for the loan 
or use of money," then the "loan or use of money" language 
in section 502 would be superfluous. 
 
We thus conclude that homeowners are without a remedy 
under the LIPL, and we will affirm the dismissal of the 
Houck plaintiffs' LIPL claim.20 
 
4. Unjust enrichment 
 
The district court viewed the Pollice plaintiffs' unjust 
enrichment claim21 as "largely dependant on the argument 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Defendants also rely on a line of cases holding that the usury statute 
does not apply to a sale of goods on credit. See In re Estate of Braun, 
650 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Grannas , 218 A.2d at 82 ("[T]his 
act [the predecessor to the LIPL] does not apply to a bona fide sale of 
goods on credit. Such sales are the result of a decision by a buyer to 
purchase property on credit at a higher price than he would pay if he 
paid cash. There is no loan or use of money on the part of the buyer."). 
In light of our conclusion that homeowners are not entitled to relief 
under the LIPL in any event, we need not address this line of cases. 
 
21. In Appeal No. 99-3998, the Houck plaintiffs present arguments 
regarding unjust enrichment. Yet, at the time of the district court's July 
29, 1999 ruling on the motions for summary judgment, only the Pollice 
plaintiffs had asserted an unjust enrichment claim. It was not until 
some two months later that the Houck plaintiffs were granted leave to 
amend their complaint to add an unjust enrichment claim. As was the 
case with the Pollice plaintiffs' LIPL claim, we lack jurisdiction to make 
any ruling regarding the Houck plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim 
because the certified orders did not address that claim. As the unjust 
enrichment issue is the only issue raised by the Houck plaintiffs in 
Appeal No. 99-3998, we will dismiss that appeal. 
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that the original owners of the liens and claims[the 
government entities] could not assign their right to charge 
higher interest and penalties to National Tax." Pollice, 59 F. 
Supp.2d at 491. In light of the Maierhoffer ruling on 
assignability, the court dismissed the unjust enrichment 
claim. While the district court viewed this claim as limited 
to what may be termed a "non-assignability" theory, the 
Pollice plaintiffs' complaint appears broad enough to 
encompass a claim based on an "illegal rate" theory--i.e. 
that the defendants have been unjustly enriched by virtue 
of their collection of interest and penalties beyond that 
allowed by Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, S 7143. See app. at 93. 
The district court did not address such a theory. Under the 
circumstances, we will reverse the grant of summary 
judgment in defendants' favor and allow further 
proceedings with respect to the unjust enrichment claim. 
The district court should consider whether the Pollice 
plaintiffs have waived the illegal rate theory by choosing to 
proceed on a non-assignability theory.22  The district court 
also may consider any other defenses to an unjust 
enrichment claim which have been properly preserved by 
defendants. 
 
B. FDCPA Issues 
 
1. Whether the water, sewer and tax obligations 
       constitute "debts" 
 
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 
U.S.C. S 1692 et seq., provides a remedy for consumers who 
have been subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt 
collection practices by debt collectors. See Zimmerman v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Defendants contend that the Pollice plaintiffs are estopped to pursue 
the illegal rate theory based on an interrogatory response in which the 
plaintiffs stated as follows: "There is no authority under state law for 
the 
City, the School District and the Water Authority to assign the right 
possessed by each of them to assess interest and penalties at an 
aggregate rate of 1.5% per month." See app. at 1327 (emphasis added); 
br. of appellees in No. 99-4049 at 22. The Pollice plaintiffs contend that 
their response inadvertently omitted the word "allegedly" from the 
emphasized phrase. On remand, the district court should consider this 
interrogatory response, as well as other relevant factors, to determine if 
the Pollice plaintiffs in fact waived the illegal rate theory. 
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HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir. 1987). "A 
threshold requirement for application of the FDCPA is that 
the prohibited practices are used in an attempt to collect a 
`debt.' " Id.; see 15 U.S.C. SS 1692e-f. The FDCPA defines 
"debt" as "any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer 
to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the 
money, property, insurance, or services which are the 
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has 
been reduced to judgment." 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(5). 
 
Like the district court, we conclude that homeowners' 
water and sewer obligations meet the definition of"debt"; 
indeed, these obligations constituted "debts" from the time 
they initially were owed to the government entities, and 
they retained that status after their assignment to NTF. At 
the time these obligations first arose, homeowners 
("consumers" of water and sewer services) had an 
"obligation . . . to pay money" to the government entities 
which arose out of a "transaction" (requesting water and 
sewer service) the subject of which was "services. . . 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."23 
 
Defendants, relying on a statement in our Zimmerman 
decision, argue that the water, sewer and tax claims are not 
"debts" because there was no "offer or extension of credit" 
to homeowners. See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1168 ("We 
find that the type of transaction which may give rise to a 
`debt' as defined in the FDCPA, is the same type of 
transaction as is dealt with in all other subchapters of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act, i.e., one involving the offer 
or extension of credit to a consumer.") (emphasis added). As 
the district court noted, see Pollice, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 484 
n.9, this statement from Zimmerman has been widely 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. As mentioned, the Pollice class includes all owners of real property 
in 
Pittsburgh subject to the assigned claims and liens, while the Houck 
class is limited to owner-occupants of homes. We are certain that the 
water and sewer obligations owed by members of the Pollice class who 
own their property for business purposes are not "debts" because the 
services are not "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." 
On remand, the district court will be required to distinguish any such 
members of the Pollice class from those members who are owner- 
occupants of homes for purposes of the FDCPA claims. 
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disavowed by several other courts of appeals, which have 
taken the broader view that the FDCPA applies to all 
obligations to pay money which arise out of consensual 
consumer transactions, regardless of whether credit has 
been offered or extended. See, e.g., Romea v. Heiberger & 
Assocs., 163 F.3d 111, 114 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
several circuits have "disavowed" the "dicta" in Zimmerman 
that the FDCPA applies only to transactions involving the 
"offer or extension of credit"); Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car 
Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
Zimmerman "[t]o the extent that it read an extension of 
credit requirement into the definition of debt"); Bass v. 
Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, 111 F.3d 1322, 
1325-26 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting Zimmerman and 
indicating that "[a]s long as the transaction creates an 
obligation to pay, a debt is created"); see also Wayne Hill, 
Annotation, What Constitutes "Debt" for Purposes of Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act, 159 A.L.R. Fed. 121, 131 
(2000) ("The term `debt' as used in the [FDCPA] has been 
construed broadly to include any obligation to pay arising 
out of a consumer transaction."). 
 
We are not bound by the "disavowed" statement in 
Zimmerman, as it was dictum.24 In our view, the plain 
meaning of section 1692a(5) indicates that a "debt" is 
created whenever a consumer is obligated to pay money as 
a result of a transaction whose subject is primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes. No "offer or 
extension of credit" is required. Accordingly, homeowners' 
original obligations to pay the government entities for water 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. In Zimmerman, we held that the FDCPA did not apply to attempts to 
collect money from persons who allegedly had committed cable television 
theft. See Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1167-69. We indicated that the 
FDCPA was intended to protect those who have "contracted for goods or 
services and [are] unable to pay for them," and that the statute was not 
intended to "protect against a perceived problem with the use of abusive 
practices in collecting tort settlements from alleged tortfeasors through 
threats of legal action." Id. at 1168. Clearly, there was no "debt" in 
Zimmerman because the obligations arose out of theft rather than a 
"transaction." This was our holding and we certainly adhere to it. The 
further statement that a transaction must involve the "offer or extension 
of credit" in order to be covered by the FDCPA was not necessary to the 
decision. 
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and sewer service constituted "debts," even though the 
government entities did not extend homeowners any right 
to defer payment of their obligations. 
 
We further agree with the district court's conclusion that 
homeowners' property tax obligations do not constitute 
"debts" under the FDCPA. In Staub v. Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 
we specifically held that a per capita tax obligation is not a 
"debt" for purposes of the FDCPA. Id. at 276-79. We stated 
that "at a minimum, the statute contemplates that the debt 
has arisen as a result of the rendition of a service or 
purchase of property or other item of value. The 
relationship between taxpayer and taxing authority does 
not encompass the type of pro tanto exchange which the 
statutory definition [of `debt'] envisages." Id. at 278; see 
also Beggs v. Rossi, 145 F.3d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(following Staub and stating that in the tax situation 
"[t]here is simply no `transaction' . . . of the kind 
contemplated by the statute"). Staub is controlling here. 
Simply put, property taxes are not obligations "arising out 
of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, 
or services which are the subject of the transaction are 
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." 
 
The Houck plaintiffs contend that the property tax 
obligations are "debts" because they arise out of the 
"transaction" in which each property owner acquired his or 
her property. See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in 
Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 47-48. We reject this 
argument. Unlike a sales tax, for example, which arguably 
arises from the sale transaction, the property taxes at issue 
here arose not from the purchase of property but from the 
fact of ownership. In Beggs, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit rejected an argument similar to that of the 
Houck plaintiffs regarding a tax on automobiles. See Beggs, 
145 F.3d at 512. The court stated that "the tax is not levied 
upon the purchase or registration of the vehicle per se, but 
rather upon the ownership of the vehicle by the citizen"; 
thus, the court held that there was no "transaction" for 
purposes of the FDCPA. Id. (emphasis added). We agree 
with this reasoning. 
 
In attempting to distinguish Staub, the homeowners 
argue that the tax obligations changed in character and 
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became "debts" when they were assigned to NTF. We 
disagree. Although the tax claims were transferred to a 
private entity, the homeowners' obligation to pay the claims 
still did not "aris[e] out of a transaction in which the 
money, property, insurance, or services which are the 
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, 
or household purposes." Rather, the obligation to pay arose 
from the levying of taxes upon the ownership of property. 
After assignment of the claims to NTF, there still had not 
been a "transaction" involving the homeowners; their 
obligation to pay NTF still arose from the levying of taxes.25 
 
The Houck plaintiffs contend that the creation of the 
payment plans distinguishes this case from Staub --that is, 
the payment plans for the tax obligations represent 
"transactions" giving rise to "debts" covered by the FDCPA. 
See reply br. of appellants/cross-appellees in Nos. 99-3858 
and 99-3859 at 44-45, 49. While we do not doubt that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Plaintiffs rely on our decision in Simon v. Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17 (3d 
Cir. 
1995), in arguing that the tax claims changed in character upon their 
assignment to NTF. The plaintiff in Simon was a private purchaser of tax 
lien certificates on certain real property in New Jersey. Id. at 19. The 
plaintiff requested the FDIC--which held mortgages on the property--to 
consent to foreclosure of its mortgage interests. Id. The FDIC refused. 
Id. 
The plaintiff commenced foreclosure proceedings in state court; the FDIC 
removed to federal court, where it argued that federal law precluded the 
plaintiff from extinguishing its mortgages without its consent. Id. The 
plaintiff argued that the Tax Injunction Act ("TIA") divested the district 
court of jurisdiction. Id. at 22. We disagreed: 
 
        We do not necessarily agree with plaintiff that the district 
court's 
       application of [12 U.S.C.] S 1825(b)(2) to protect the mortgage 
       interests of the FDIC violates the TIA because it suspends the 
       collection of taxes under state law until the FDIC consents to 
       foreclosure of the tax liens. Withholding consent to foreclose from 
a 
       private citizen does not implicate the assessment, levy, or 
collection 
       of any tax. The statute is intended to prevent interference with 
       taxation by governmental entities; however, upon the sale of the 
tax 
       certificate, the tax obligation is satisfied. The holder's 
inability to 
       foreclose does not affect the governmental entity's ability to 
assess, 
       levy, or collect any tax, and thus, the TIA is not applicable. 
 
Id. We believe Simon is inapposite here, as it involved an entirely 
different federal statute (the TIA) with different underlying purposes. 
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payment plans are "transactions," we do not believe the 
plans serve to bring defendants within the coverage of the 
FDCPA with respect to the tax obligations. The FDCPA is 
aimed at the conduct of debt collectors who are seeking to 
collect "debts." See 15 U.S.C. S 1692 (statement of 
congressional findings and purpose); Zimmerman , 834 F.2d 
at 1167. For purposes of the FDCPA, we view the payment 
plans simply as one aspect of defendants' course of conduct 
in attempting to collect the original water, sewer and tax 
obligations which were owed to the government entities and 
then assigned to NTF; that is, all of defendants' debt- 
collection activity (including the creation of the payment 
plans and subsequent conduct) has been directed toward 
the collection of the original obligations, not any obligations 
which may have arisen from the payment plans. As we have 
concluded, in their original form, the water and sewer 
obligations were "debts" under section 1692a(5) but the tax 
obligations were not. Accordingly, we hold that the FDCPA 
is inapplicable to all of defendants' conduct relating to the 
tax obligations, including conduct occurring after the 
creation of the payment plans. 
 
In sum, we will affirm the dismissal of the FDCPA claims 
with respect to the tax obligations, and we further will 
affirm the district court's determination that the water and 
sewer obligations constitute "debts" under the FDCPA. 
 
2. Whether NTF and CAH are "debt collectors" under the 
       FDCPA 
 
The district court accepted defendants' argument that 
NTF and CAH "cannot be considered `debt collectors' 
because they are not in the business of collecting debts and 
do not in fact collect debts." Pollice 59 F. Supp.2d at 486. 
The court agreed with defendants' contention that CARC is 
"the sole defendant which has contracted with the 
[government entities] to service and collect the claims 
owned by [NTF]." Id. Accordingly, the court dismissed the 
FDCPA claims against NTF and CAH. Id. at 491. The Houck 
plaintiffs argue on appeal that NTF and CAH, along with 
CARC, are "debt collectors" under the FDCPA. 
 
The FDCPA's provisions generally apply only to "debt 
collectors." Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 
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211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000). Creditors--as opposed 
to "debt collectors"--generally are not subject to the 
FDCPA. See Aubert v. American Gen. Fin., Inc. , 137 F.3d 
976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Creditors who collect in their own 
name and whose principal business is not debt collection 
. . . are not subject to the Act . . . . Because creditors are 
generally presumed to restrain their abusive collection 
practices out of a desire to protect their corporate goodwill, 
their debt collection activities are not subject to the Act 
unless they collect under a name other than their own."); 
Staub, 626 F.2d at 277 ("The [FDCPA] does not apply to 
persons or businesses collecting debts on their own 
behalf."); Hon. D. Duff McKee, Liability of Debt Collector to 
Debtor under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 
41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 159, at S 3 (1997) [hereinafter 
McKee] ("[I]nterestingly, the term `debt collector' does not 
include the creditor collecting its own debt."). 
 
The FDCPA contains a detailed definition of "debt 
collector." See 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(6). The term means "any 
person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or the mails in any business the principal 
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who 
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or 
indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due 
another." Id. The definition excludes several categories of 
persons, including officers or employees of government. See 
id. 
 
We conclude that NTF is a "debt collector," and 
accordingly the district court should not have dismissed the 
FDCPA claims against it. Courts have indicated that an 
assignee of an obligation is not a "debt collector" if the 
obligation is not in default at the time of the assignment; 
conversely, an assignee may be deemed a "debt collector" if 
the obligation is already in default when it is assigned.26 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. The FDCPA's definition of "creditor" is "any person who offers or 
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term 
does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment 
or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating 
collection of such debt for another." 15 U.S.C.S 1692a(4). The definition 
of "debt collector" excludes "any person collecting or attempting to 
collect 
any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the 
extent such activity . . . (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default 
at 
the time it was obtained by such person." 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(6)(F). 
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See Bailey v. Security Nat'l Servicing Corp., 154 F.3d 384, 
387-88 (7th Cir. 1998); Whitaker v. Ameritech Corp., 129 
F.3d 952, 958-59 (7th Cir. 1997); Wadlington v. Credit 
Acceptance Corp., 76 F.3d 103, 106-07 (6th Cir. 1996); 
McKee S 3 ("[O]ne who acquires the debt after it is in default 
is deemed a debt collector, and is subject to the provisions 
of the Act. Conversely, the assignee of a debt who acquires 
it before default is considered the owner of the debt and 
may pursue collection without concern for the limitations of 
the FDCPA."). Here, there is no dispute that the various 
claims assigned to NTF were in default prior to their 
assignment to NTF. Further, there is no question that the 
"principal purpose" of NTF 's business is the "collection of 
any debts," namely, defaulted obligations which it 
purchases from municipalities.27 
 
As mentioned, the district court was influenced by the 
fact that only CARC contracted to undertake debt-collection 
activity in connection with the assigned claims. We believe, 
however, that NTF may be held vicariously liable for CARC's 
collection activity. Although there is relatively little case law 
on the subject of vicarious liability under the FDCPA, there 
are cases supporting the notion that an entity which itself 
meets the definition of "debt collector" may be held 
vicariously liable for unlawful collection activities carried 
out by another on its behalf. In Fox v. Citicorp Credit 
Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994), the court 
indicated that a company which had been asked to collect 
a defaulted debt could be held vicariously liable for its 
attorney's conduct which was in violation of the FDCPA. 
See id. at 1516. By contrast, in Wadlington , supra, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to impose 
vicarious liability on a company for the actions of its 
attorney; in the court's view, vicarious liability could not be 
imposed because the company itself did not meet the 
definition of "debt collector": 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Defendants' motion for summary judgment before the district court 
stated that "NTF exists solely for the purpose of holding claims for 
delinquent taxes and municipal obligations." App. at 135. Further, an 
affidavit of a CARC officer provides that "NTF purchases liens and claims 
from municipal entities across the country" and it refers to "the 
delinquent liens and claims [NTF] owns." App. at 514. 
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        We do not think it would accord with the intent of 
       Congress, as manifested in the terms of the [FDCPA], 
       for a company that is not a debt collector to be held 
       vicariously liable for a collection suit filing that violates 
       the Act only because the filing attorney is a`debt 
       collector.' Section 1692k imposes liability only on a 
       `debt collector who fails to comply with [a] provision of 
       this subchapter . . . .' The plaintiffs would have us 
       impose liability on non-debt collectors too. This we 
       decline to do. 
 
Wadlington, 76 F.3d at 108 (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Wadlington court specifically distinguished Fox 
because in Fox the entity allegedly vicariously liable for the 
attorney's conduct was itself a debt collector. See id. The 
rule to be gleaned from Fox and Wadlington has been 
summarized by a state court decision as follows: 
 
       [F]ederal courts that have considered the issue have 
       held that the client of an attorney who is a `debt 
       collector,' as defined in S 1692a(6), is vicariously liable 
       for the attorney's misconduct if the client is itself a debt 
       collector as defined in the statute. Thus, vicarious 
       liability under the FDCPA will be imposed for an 
       attorney's violations of the FDCPA if both the attorney 
       and the client are debt collectors as defined in 
       S 1692a(6). 
 
First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins v. Soucie , 924 P.2d 
1200, 1202 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added). 
 
Although these cases involved the attorney-client 
situation, we believe they may be applied here. Thus, we 
conclude that NTF--which itself meets the definition of 
"debt collector"--may be held vicariously liable for CARC's 
collection activity. We believe this is a fair result because 
an entity that is itself a "debt collector"--and hence subject 
to the FDCPA--should bear the burden of monitoring the 
activities of those it enlists to collect debts on its behalf. 
 
We now turn to the status of CAH as a "debt collector." 
As mentioned, CAH is the common general partner of CARC 
and NTF, both of which are limited partnerships. App. at 
1355. Some district courts have indicated that a general 
partner of a "debt collector" partnership may be vicariously 
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liable for the partnership's FDCPA violations under general 
principles of partnership law.28See Peters v. AT&T Corp., 43 
F. Supp.2d 926, 930 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Randle v. GC Servs., 
25 F. Supp.2d 849, 850-52 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Miller 
v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, and Clark, 214 
F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating in an FDCPA case 
that "[t]he liability of a partnership is imputed to the 
partners, and so the plaintiff was entitled to sue the 
partners as well as the partnership"). The Houck plaintiffs, 
however, indicate that they "do not rely on [CAH's] vicarious 
liability" in this case. See reply br. of appellants/cross- 
appellees in Nos. 99-3858 and 99-3859 at 57. Instead, they 
argue that CAH is directly liable because it "is involved [in 
the collection of debts] through the corporations[sic] it has 
set up and fully control." Id. 
 
Despite the Houck plaintiffs' conclusory statement that 
they do not rely on vicarious liability, in effect their 
argument that CAH is directy liable seems to us in fact to 
implicate vicarious liability principles because they contend 
that CAH's involvement in the debt collection is through the 
other defendants. Thus, we consider the case on that basis 
and conclude that the general partner of a "debt collector" 
limited partnership may be held vicariously liable for the 
partnership's conduct under the FDCPA. In light of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. As we have indicated, NTF meets the definition of "debt collector." It 
is clear that CARC meets the definition as well. An affidavit of a CARC 
officer states that "NTF does not service or collect the . . . claims it 
owns," but instead "[t]he collection or servicing . . . is done by CARC, 
NTF 's servicing agent." App. at 514. CARC does not argue on this appeal 
that it does not meet the primary definition of"debt collector"; it merely 
argues that it falls under an exclusion for government officers or 
employees. We reject that contention in the succeeding section of this 
opinion. 
 
We note that the FDCPA contains the following exemption from the 
definition of "debt collector": "[A]ny person while acting as a debt 
collector for another person, both of whom are related by common 
ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a 
debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or 
affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the 
collection of debts." See 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(6)(B). This exemption has not 
been raised in this case. 
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general partner's role in managing the affairs of the 
partnership, we see no reason why the general partner 
should not be responsible for conduct of the partnership 
which violates the FDCPA. Liability for the general partner 
is particularly appropriate under the facts of this case--NTF 
has no employees, app. at 514, and accordingly we 
presume that its actions are taken through the personnel of 
CAH. Indeed, an officer of CAH executed the Purchase 
Agreements on behalf of NTF, as well as the Servicing 
Agreements on behalf of CARC. See app. at 540, 874, 906, 
1113. Accordingly, we conclude that CAH may be held 
liable for any conduct of NTF and CARC which violated the 
FDCPA.29 
 
In sum, we conclude that NTF and CAH may be held 
liable under the FDCPA, and accordingly we will reverse the 
grant of summary judgment in their favor. 
 
3. Whether CARC is exempt as a government officer or 
       employee 
 
CARC argues that it is exempt from the definition of "debt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated as follows 
regarding the liability of shareholders and employees of "debt collector" 
corporations: 
 
       Because such individuals do not become `debt collectors' simply by 
       working for or owning stock in debt collection companies, we held 
       [in a prior decision] that the [FDCPA] does not contemplate 
personal 
       liability for shareholders or employees of debt collection 
companies 
       who act on behalf of those companies, except perhaps in limited 
       instances where the corporate veil is pierced . . . . Individuals 
who 
       do not otherwise meet the statutory definition of`debt collector' 
       cannot be held liable under the Act . . . . FDCPA suits against the 
       owners of a debt collection company who are not otherwise debt 
       collectors are frivolous and might well warrant sanctions. 
 
Pettit, 211 F.3d at 1059 (citations omitted). Here, we do not deal with 
the 
liability of a shareholder of a "debt collector" corporation, nor do we 
deal 
with the liability of a person who merely works for a "debt collector" 
company. Rather, we deal with the liability of the general partner where 
the limited partnership meets the definition of"debt collector." We 
believe that a general partner exercising control over the affairs of such 
a partnership may be held liable under the FDCPA for the acts of the 
partnership. See Miller, 214 F.3d at 876. 
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collector" under 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(6)(C) because it is "in 
effect acting as an `officer or employee of the United States 
or any State' pursuant to the Servicing Agreements with the 
City and the PWSA." Br. of appellees/cross-appellants in 
Nos. 99-3856 and 99-3857 at 44-45. Section 1692a(6)(C) 
provides: 
 
       The term [`debt collector'] does not include-- . . . (C) 
       any officer or employee of the United States or any State30 
       to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any 
       debt is in the performance of his official duties. 
 
Like the district court, we reject this argument. The 
exemption expressly is limited to "any officer or employee of 
the United States or any State." CARC is not an"officer or 
employee" of any government entity. The exemption does 
not extend to those who are merely in a contractual 
relationship with the government. See Brannan v. United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1996) 
("This exemption applies only to an individual government 
official or employee who collects debts as part of his 
government employment responsibilities. USA Funds is a 
private nonprofit organization with a government contract; 
it is not a government agency or employee.") (emphasis 
added). 
 
4. Substantive FDCPA violations 
 
The homeowners claim that defendants have violated 15 
U.S.C. S 1692f(1), which provides: 
 
       A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable 
       means to collect or attempt to collect any debt . . . . 
       [T]he following conduct is a violation of this section: (1) 
       The collection of any amount (including any interest, 
       fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal 
       obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized 
       by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 
 
S 1692f(1) (emphasis added). The homeowners contend that 
defendants have violated this provision by collecting 
interest and penalty rates which are neither authorized by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. The term "State" includes political subdivisions. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 1692a(8). 
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agreement nor permitted by law--that is, rates in excess of 
the ten percent limit set forth in Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, 
S 7143. The Pollice plaintiffs further claim that the 
defendants have violated 15 U.S.C. S 1692e, which 
prohibits the use of various "false, deceptive, or misleading" 
representations or means by debt collectors. The district 
court held that CARC has violated section 1692f(1)"to the 
extent that it charged a rate of interest and penalties for 
water and sewer claims not authorized by law," but it 
expressly declined to rule on the section 1692e claims in its 
summary judgment ruling. See Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 
486. In light of the district court's decision not to address 
the section 1692e claims, we will not address them on 
appeal. Further proceedings with respect to such claims 
will be required on remand. 
 
With regard to section 1692f(1), the question is whether 
the rates of interest and penalties the defendants charged 
are "expressly authorized by the agreement creating the 
debt or permitted by law." We agree with the district court 
that the rates are not "permitted by law" because they are 
in excess of the ten percent limit set forth in Pa. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 53, S 7143. Although the rates charged by the 
defendants are in a sense authorized by the local 
ordinances and resolution, we cannot say that they are 
"permitted by law" as they are in direct violation of a state 
statute.31 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. The defendants raised before the district court the FDCPA's "bona 
fide error" defense. A provision of the FDCPA states: 
 
       A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under 
       this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of 
       evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a 
       bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures 
       reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1692k(c). The defendants argued that "in determining the 
rates to be charged plaintiffs, it relied on the representations of the 
City, 
School District and PWSA that the rates were appropriate, as well as the 
fact that these entities had empirically been charging these rates." 
Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 486-87. The district court indicated that the 
bona fide error defense may apply to errors of legal judgment as well as 
clerical errors, but it denied summary judgment because "questions of 
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Defendants argue, however, that the rates are "expressly 
authorized by the agreement creating the debt." In this 
regard, defendants contend that "[w]here rates are set by 
municipal ordinance or regulation, the ordinance or 
regulation should be considered the `agreement creating the 
debt.' " Br. of appellees/cross-appellants in Nos. 99-3856 
and 99-3857 at 39. In other words, they contend that a 
consumer who subscribes to water or sewer service 
impliedly agrees to pay the rates set forth by local laws. 
Defendants further contend that the rates are "expressly 
authorized" by the payment plans. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently 
addressed section 1692f(1) in a case involving a debt 
collector's imposition of a service charge for a dishonored 
check. See Tuttle v. Equifax Check, 190 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 
1999). The court commented as follows: 
 
       Under the FDCPA, [the debt collector] may impose a 
       service charge if (i) the customer expressly agrees to 
       the charge in the contract creating the debt or (ii) the 
       charge is permitted by law. See 15 U.S.C.S 1692f(1). In 
       other words, 
 
        If state law expressly permits service charges, a 
       service charge may be imposed even if the contract is 
       silent on the matter; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
material fact exist concerning those measures which were taken by 
defendants to insure that they are entitled to charge a rate of over 10% 
in interest and penalties for past-due tax debts, water charges and sewer 
charges." Id. at 487. The district court's ruling on the bona fide error 
defense is not at issue on appeal, and accordingly we do not address the 
matter. It suffices to say that defendants may argue at trial that they 
cannot be held liable under the FDCPA based on their reliance on the 
local ordinances and resolution and the representations of the 
government entities. For purposes of section 1692f(1), however, we must 
conclude that defendants' rates are not "permitted by law." 
 
The defendants further contend that the Pollice plaintiffs are estopped 
from challenging the legality of the interest and penalty rates based on 
a statement in an interrogatory response. See  reply br. of cross- 
appellants in Nos. 99-3856 and 99-3857 at 12-13. As we indicated with 
regard to the unjust enrichment claim, see supra  note 22, we leave it to 
the district court to determine if the Pollice plaintiffs in fact are 
estopped. 
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        If state law expressly prohibits service charges, a 
       service charge cannot be imposed even if the contract 
       allows it; 
        If state law neither affirmatively permits nor 
       expressly prohibits service charges, a service charge 
       can be imposed only if the customer expressly agrees 
       to it in the contract. 
 
Id. at 13.32 The court further indicated that an agreement 
authorizing a particular charge need not be in writing; 
thus, a debt collector " `may collect a service charge on a 
dishonored check based on a posted sign on the merchant's 
premises allowing such a charge, if he can demonstrate 
that the consumer knew of the charge.' " Id. at 15 (quoting 
Federal Trade Commission Staff Commentary on the 
FDCPA, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,108 (1988)). 
 
Under the interpretation set forth in the Staff 
Commentary and Tuttle, the defendants presumably have 
violated section 1692f(1) regardless of the presence of any 
agreement authorizing the rates of interest and penalties, 
because state law specifically prohibits charging interest in 
excess of ten percent on the assigned claims. In any event, 
we do not believe the rates defendants charged are 
"expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt." 
Although the agreement need not be in writing, we believe 
the term "expressly authorized by the agreement creating 
the debt" requires some actual knowledge or consent by the 
consumer during the course of the transaction which gives 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. The court relied on a Federal Trade Commission Staff Commentary 
on the FDCPA. See 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097 (1988). The commentary 
provides: 
 
       A debt collector may attempt to collect a fee or charge in addition 
to 
       the debt if either (a) [sic] the charge is expressly provided for 
in the 
       contract creating the debt and the charge is not prohibited by 
state 
       law, or (B) the contract is silent but the charge is otherwise 
       expressly permitted by state law. Conversely, a debt collector may 
       not collect an additional amount if either (A) state law expressly 
       prohibits collection of the amount or (B) the contract does not 
       provide for collection of the amount and state law is silent. 
 
53 Fed. Reg. at 50,108. 
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rise to the debt. As we have indicated, the "debts" which 
defendants have undertaken to collect are homeowners' 
original obligations arising out of their subscription to 
water and sewer services. The "agreement creating the 
debt" therefore was the transaction between each 
homeowner and the relevant government entity relating to 
the provision of water and sewer services. Defendants do 
not contend that the interest and penalty rates were 
"expressly" set forth in these agreements or transactions, 
nor do they contend that homeowners actually consented to 
or were aware of the rates when they subscribed to the 
services. The most defendants can say is that the rates 
were made an implicit part of such transactions because 
they are set forth in municipal ordinances and resolutions. 
We do not believe this suffices. Nor can defendants rely on 
the payment plans, as the plans are not the "agreement 
creating the debt." Rather, as stated, the "debts" to which 
all of defendants' collection activities have been directed are 
the original water and sewer obligations, which arose out of 
the transactions between homeowners and the government 
entities. 
 
Thus, we conclude that defendants have violated section 
1692f(1) by collecting amounts not expressly authorized by 
the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 
 
5. Summary of conclusions regarding FDCPA claims 
 
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
defendants with respect to the tax obligations, and we 
further will affirm the district court's determination that the 
water and sewer obligations constitute "debts" under the 
FDCPA. We will reverse the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of NTF and CAH, and we will affirm the district court's 
determination that CARC is not exempt from the definition 
of "debt collector." We further conclude, as did the district 
court, that defendants have violated section 1692f(1). We 
will remand for further proceedings on the FDCPA claims in 
light of these rulings.33 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. As mentioned, such further proceedings will include a determination 
of defendants' entitlement to the "bona fide error" defense. 
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C. TILA Issues 
 
1. Whether the payment plans constitute "consumer 
       credit transactions" 
 
The Pollice plaintiffs' claim under the Truth-in-Lending 
Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. S 1601 et seq., arises under 15 
U.S.C. S 1638, which requires certain disclosures by a 
"creditor" in connection with a "consumer credit 
transaction." Plaintiffs argue that they entered into 
"consumer credit transactions" when they entered into the 
payment plans. 
 
TILA defines "credit" as "the right granted by a creditor to 
a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer 
its payment." 15 U.S.C. S 1602(e) (emphasis added). It 
further defines "consumer": 
 
       The adjective `consumer', used with reference to a 
       credit transaction, characterizes the transaction as one 
       in which the party to whom credit is offered or 
       extended is a natural person, and the money, property, 
       or services which are the subject of the transaction are 
       primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1602(h). 
 
We believe that "consumer credit transactions" arose 
when homeowners entered into payment plans with respect 
to the water and sewer obligations. As to these obligations, 
NTF has extended "credit" (the "right . . . to defer payment 
of debt") to homeowners ("natural person[s]"), and the 
"services" which are the subject of the credit transaction 
(water and sewer) are "primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes." See sections 1602(e), (h).34 
 
As to the tax obligations, however, the district court 
concluded that the payment plans do not constitute 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. This conclusion does not apply with respect to members of the Pollice 
class who own property for business purposes, as opposed to owner- 
occupants of homes. Water and sewer services provided to businesses 
are not "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." On 
remand, the district court will have to distinguish between those who 
own property for business purposes and those who are owner-occupants 
of homes with respect to the TILA claim. 
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"consumer credit transactions." The court reasoned as 
follows: 
 
        National Tax [NTF] claims that it is [not subject to 
       TILA liability], at least with respect to the tax liens at 
       issue, on the basis that the Court of Appeals has 
       determined that a tax debt is not considered primarily 
       for personal, family or household purposes under the 
       FDCPA. See Staub, 626 F.2d 275. Defendants further 
       contend that Regulation Z expressly states that the 
       payment of tax liens is not considered `credit' subject 
       to the TILA. The Federal Reserve Board Official Staff 
       Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. 
       I at 299 (1998), concerning exclusions from the 
       definition of credit found at 12 C.F.R. S 226.2(a)(14), 
       provides that `tax liens, tax assessments, court 
       judgments, and court approvals of reaffirmation of 
       debts in bankruptcy' are excluded from the definition. 
       The Staff Commentary continues, noting that `third- 
       party financing of such obligations (for example, a 
       bank loan obtained to pay off a tax lien) is credit for 
       the purposes of the regulation.' 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, 
       Supp. I at 299 (1998). 
 
        . . . National Tax, as the legal holder of the tax liens 
       at issue, maintains the rights of the original holder of 
       the liens. Such liens are not considered any less tax 
       claims by virtue of their assignment to National Tax. 
       This holding is consistent with Maierhoffer v. GLS 
       Capital, Inc., where the court found that tax liens are 
       assignable as a matter of law under the Municipal 
       Claims and Tax Liens Act. 
 
        While we have found that the payment plans offered 
       by defendants altered the relationship between the 
       parties so as to create a forbearance where none 
       otherwise existed, we did not conclude that the nature 
       of the underlying claim had been extinguished. Thus, 
       we cannot agree with plaintiffs' contention that 
       defendants somehow altered the nature of the tax liens 
       by offering payment plans. The forbearance by National 
       Tax under the terms of the payment plans does not 
       constitute third-party financing as contemplated under 
       Regulation Z. Further, National Tax, as the owner of 
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       the tax liens, is not a third party lender. Accordingly, 
       we will grant defendants' motion for summary 
       judgment with respect to the tax liens at issue . . . . 
 
Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 490-91. 
 
We agree that the payment plans do not constitute 
"consumer credit transactions" with respect to the tax 
obligations. A "consumer credit transaction" involves the 
offer or extension of "credit" to a consumer. See section 
1602(h). "Credit" is defined as "the right granted by a 
creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt  or to incur 
debt and defer its payment." See section 1602(e) (emphasis 
added). As we have concluded with regard to the FDCPA, a 
tax obligation is not a "debt"; thus, the payment plans do 
not involve an extension of "credit" under TILA with regard 
to the tax obligations. Although section 1602 does not 
contain a definition of the term "debt," we believe the term 
as used in section 1602(e) should be construed as it is 
defined in the FDCPA.35 Simply put, the payment plans 
with respect to the tax obligations do not involve the 
granting of a right to defer payment of "debts," but rather 
the granting of a right to defer payment of tax obligations, 
which are not "debts." 
 
We agree with the district court's interpretation of the 
Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, TILA's implementing 
regulation. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2000). The commentary 
provides as follows: 
 
       The following situations are not considered credit for 
       purposes of the regulation: . . . . Tax liens, tax 
       assessments, court judgments, and court approvals of 
       reaffirmation of debts in bankruptcy. However, third- 
       party financing of such obligations (for example, a 
       bank loan obtained to pay off a tax lien) is credit for 
       purposes of the regulation. 
 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I at 299 (2000). The commentary 
thus implies that the granting of a right to defer payment 
of a tax obligation is not "credit" for purposes of TILA. We 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
35. Such a construction is logical in light of the similarity between the 
definition of "consumer" in section 1602(h) and the definition of "debt" 
under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. S 1692a(5). 
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believe the payment plans are not analogous to the 
situation in which a third party, such as a bank, makes a 
loan to a consumer which is then used to satisfy a tax 
obligation. In that situation, the third party's loan to the 
borrower constitutes an extension of "credit" which is 
independent of the tax obligation--the lender grants the 
borrower the right to "incur debt [the loan] and defer its 
payment," see section 1602(e), and the loan is "for 
personal, family, or household purposes," see  section 
1602(h), because it is used to satisfy an obligation on the 
borrower's home. 
 
Our reasoning with regard to the tax obligations is 
supported by Bonfiglio v. Nugent, 986 F.2d 1391 (11th Cir. 
1993). In that case, state courts twice ordered the plaintiff 
to pay sums of money for fees and costs directly to the law 
firm which had represented his wife in divorce proceedings. 
Id. at 1392. The law firm agreed to allow the plaintiff to pay 
the sums in installments. Id. The plaintiff then sued the 
firm under TILA, claiming that the firm had failed to 
provide him with a financial disclosure statement when it 
agreed to allow him to pay in installments. Id.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the above- 
quoted commentary to Regulation Z, affirmed the dismissal 
of the plaintiff 's suit. The court commented: 
 
        It is frivolous to contend that the Truth in Lending 
       Act applies either to a debt created by a court order 
       requiring one party to pay another's fees and costs, or 
       to a related payment plan ordered by the court or 
       worked out by the parties. `Credit,' as that term is used 
       in the Truth in Lending Act, manifestly does not 
       include court judgments or orders. [Citing commentary 
       to Regulation Z]. [Plaintiff 's] court-ordered obligation to 
       pay the two sums to his ex-wife's law firm, and the 
       resulting installment plans, were clearly not`consumer 
       credit transactions' within the meaning of the Truth in 
       Lending Act. 
 
Id. at 1393 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We believe 
the same reasoning should apply to defendants' payment 
plans relating to the tax obligations. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the payment plans constitute 
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"consumer credit transactions" under TILA with respect to 
the water and sewer obligations, but not the tax 
obligations. Accordingly, we will affirm the dismissal of the 
Pollice plaintiffs' TILA claim with respect to the tax 
obligations.36 
 
2. Whether NTF is a "creditor" 
 
NTF argues that it is not a "creditor" under TILA. 
"Creditor" is defined in pertinent part as follows: 
 
       The term `creditor' refers only to a person who both (1) 
       regularly extends, whether in connection with loans, 
       sales of property or services, or otherwise, consumer 
       credit which is payable by agreement in more than four 
       installments or for which the payment of a finance 
       charge is or may be required, and (2) is the person to 
       whom the debt arising from the consumer credit 
       transaction is initially payable on the face of the 
       evidence of indebtedness or, if there is no such 
       evidence of indebtedness, by agreement. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1602(f). Regulation Z provides: 
 
       Creditor means: (i) A person (A) who regularly extends 
       consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or 
       is payable by written agreement in more than 4 
       installments (not including a downpayment), and (B) to 
       whom the obligation is initially payable, either on the 
       face of the note or contract, or by agreement when 
       there is no note or contract. 
 
12 C.F.R. S 226.2(a)(17)(i) (2000).37 "[W]hether one is a TILA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. While we affirm the dismissal of the claim relating to the tax 
obligations, we do not characterize the claim as"frivolous" as did the 
court in Bonfiglio. 
 
37. Regulation Z further addresses the meaning of"regularly extends": 
 
       A person regularly extends consumer credit only if it extended 
credit 
       (other than credit subject to the requirements ofS 226.32) more 
       than 25 times (or more than 5 times for transactions secured by a 
       dwelling) in the preceding calendar year. If a person did not meet 
       these numerical standards in the preceding calendar year, the 
       numerical standards shall be applied to the current calendar year. 
       A person regularly extends consumer credit if, in any 12-month 
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creditor is a bifurcated question, requiring a person both to 
be a `creditor' in general, by extending credit in a certain 
minimum number of transactions, and to be the `creditor' 
in the specific transaction in dispute." James Lockhart, 
Annotation, Who is "Creditor" within Meaning of S 103(f) of 
Truth in Lending Act, 157 A.L.R. Fed. 419, 443 (1999). 
 
NTF does not present an argument on appeal, and 
apparently did not present an argument in the district 
court, regarding the first prong of the definition requiring 
that a person "regularly extends" consumer credit. Rather, 
NTF limits itself to the second prong of the definition. It 
contends that, even assuming the payment plans constitute 
"consumer credit transactions," there are no"debt[s] arising 
from" the payment plans. In this connection, NTF argues 
that the only "debts" involved are the water, sewer and tax 
obligations, which were "initially payable" to the 
government entities, not NTF. 
 
Like the district court, we reject NTF 's arguments and 
thus hold that it is a "creditor" with respect to the water 
and sewer payment plans.38 The payment plans are the only 
"consumer credit transactions" involved here, as they 
represent the first time that anyone extended the 
homeowners the right to defer payment of their water and 
sewer obligations. On the face of the payment plan 
enrollment forms, they are directed to make payments to 
NTF through a custodian. See app. at 98, 213-21. 
Accordingly, any debts "arising from" these"consumer 
credit transactions" are "initially payable" to NTF.39 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       period, the person originates more than one credit extension that 
is 
       subject to the requirements of S 226.32 or one or more such credit 
       extensions through a mortgage broker. 
 
12 C.F.R. S 226.2(a)(17)(i) at n.3 (2000). 
 
38. The district court accepted CARC's argument that it is not a 
"creditor" under TILA because "it is merely an agent, rather than the 
entity to which the debts are payable." Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 488 
n.14. This holding has not been challenged on appeal. 
 
39. The Staff Commentary to Regulation Z provides that "[i]f an 
obligation is initially payable to one person, that person is the creditor 
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The question arises, then, whether there are any debts 
"arising from" the payment plans. We have given due 
consideration to NTF 's argument that there are no debts 
"arising from" the plans because the plans merely provide 
for the extended payment of debts which previously arose 
from homeowners' dealings with the government entities. 
The definition of "credit," however, encompasses not only a 
right granted by a creditor to "incur debt and defer its 
payment" but also a right to "defer payment of debt." See 
section 1602(e). This latter phrase must encompass 
situations in which a debtor is granted the right to pay over 
time a pre-existing debt. See Bright v. Ball Mem'l Hosp. 
Ass'n, Inc., 616 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 1980) (indicating 
that a hospital which reached agreements with its patients 
prior to discharge to pay their bills in more than four 
installments was a "creditor" under section 1602(f)); Rogers 
Mortuary, Inc. v. White, 594 P.2d 351, 353 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1979) ("Credit is extended [under TILA] when a consumer 
incurs a debt and the parties agree to a repayment 
schedule which allows for the deferred payment of the 
debt."). Yet, in such situations, the argument may be raised 
that the grantor of the right to defer payment is not a 
"creditor" under section 1602(f) because the debt does not 
"aris[e] from the consumer credit transaction." We reject 
such a construction, as we believe the term "creditor" was 
intended to apply to one who confers such a right to defer 
the payment of a pre-existing obligation. 
 
We believe the statutory definition of "creditor" is satisfied 
in such cases because there is in essence a new"debt" 
which "aris[es] from" the "consumer credit transaction." 
Thus, there really are two types of "debt" at issue here. The 
first is the original "debt" owed by a homeowner to one of 
the government entities and later assigned to NTF. It is this 
"debt" as to which NTF has granted the "right . . . to defer 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
even if the obligation by its terms is simultaneously assigned to another 
person." 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I at 300 (2000). Although NTF is an 
assignee of claims from the government entities, plaintiffs' theory is 
that 
NTF is an initial creditor for purposes of TILA, rather than an assignee, 
because the first "consumer credit transactions" (the payment plans) are 
initially payable to NTF. See Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 488 n.12. 
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payment" within the meaning of section 1602(e), and in 
turn the granting of this right gives rise to a"consumer 
credit transaction" within the meaning of section 1602(h). 
The second "debt" is the new "debt" which "aris[es] from the 
consumer credit transaction [the payment plan]" within the 
meaning of section 1602(f). It is this "debt" which is 
"initially payable" to NTF.40 
 
NTF contends that a person who grants a right to defer 
payment of a pre-existing debt is a "creditor" only if he 
agrees to modify the relationship so as to give rise to some 
new obligation which is "initially payable" to him. According 
to NTF, 
 
       the `right to defer' portion of section 1602(e) applies 
       where an existing creditor agrees to modify a 
       previously-agreed consumer debt, for example, by 
       extending maturity of the debt in exchange for a higher 
       interest rate. In that situation, there is (1) `credit' 
       within the meaning of section 1602(e), (2) a `consumer 
       credit transaction' under section 1602(h), and (3) a 
       `creditor' under section 1602(f), because the new 
       interest obligation is a `debt arising from' the new 
       extension of credit, which is initially payable to the 
       creditor. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
40. We point out that there is no inconsistency between our conclusion 
here that there is a "debt arising from" the payment plans for purposes 
of TILA and our prior rejection of the Houck plaintiffs' argument that the 
payment plans served to bring the tax obligations within the scope of the 
FDCPA. See supra part III.B.1. As stated, for purposes of the FDCPA, we 
view all of defendants' collection activity (including post-payment plan 
conduct) as activity undertaken for purposes of collecting the original 
obligations which were owed to the government entities and then 
assigned to NTF--the first type of debt described above. As discussed, 
the original tax obligations do not meet the FDCPA's definition of "debt," 
and therefore the FDCPA is inapplicable to defendants' conduct relating 
to the tax obligations regardless of the presence of payment plans. 
Unlike the FDCPA, which is directed at debt-collection activity, TILA 
focuses on the conduct of "creditors" who extend credit to consumers. 
Accordingly, for TILA purposes, we must consider the second type of 
"debt" which arises from the payment plans as"consumer credit 
transactions." 
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Reply br. of cross-appellants in Nos. 99-3856 and 99-3857 
at 2. We reject NTF 's argument, as we see nothing in the 
language of section 1602 imposing such a requirement. 
Indeed, the language of section 1602(f) indicates that a 
person may be a creditor even if he does not impose any 
charge for the extension of credit--the first prong of the 
definition of "creditor" refers to a person who regularly 
extends consumer credit which either involves a finance 
charge or is payable in more than four installments. See 
section 1602(f). Thus, the definition contemplates that one 
who confers a right to pay a pre-existing debt in more than 
four installments will be a "creditor" regardless of whether 
any charge is imposed as an incident to such extension of 
credit.41 See Bright, 616 F.2d at 334 n.2 ("Even if these 
agreements [to pay a hospital bill over time] did not involve 
an agreement to pay a monthly 3/4% finance charge, they 
could still be a `credit' agreement requiring disclosures 
since payment was to be in more than four installments."). 
We believe that a consumer who is given the right to pay a 
pre-existing debt in installments may benefit from TILA- 
mandated disclosures even if no charge is imposed for the 
extension of credit. 
 
In sum, we conclude that NTF is a TILA "creditor" with 
respect to the payment plans for the water and sewer 
obligations, and accordingly the district court did not err in 
denying NTF summary judgment. 
 
3. Applicability of the public utility exemption 
 
NTF argues that TILA's public utility exemption is 
applicable with respect to the water and sewer claims. See 
15 U.S.C. S 1603(4) ("This subchapter does not apply to the 
following: . . . (4) Transactions under public utility tariffs, 
if the Board [of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] 
determines that a State regulatory body regulates the 
charges for the public utility services involved, the charges 
for delayed payment, and any discount allowed for early 
payment."). Regulation Z provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
41. "Finance charge" is defined generally as "the sum of all charges . . . 
imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the 
extension of credit." See 15 U.S.C. S 1605(a). 
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       This regulation does not apply to the following: . .. (c) 
       Public utility credit. An extension of credit that involves 
       public utility services provided through pipe, wire, 
       other connected facilities, or radio or similar 
       transmission . . ., if the charges for service, delayed 
       payment, or any discounts for prompt payment are 
       filed with or regulated by any government unit. 
 
12 C.F.R. S 226.3(c) (2000) (footnote omitted); see Aronson 
v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 180 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(discussing this exemption). 
 
NTF contends that it has charged the same interest and 
penalty rates with respect to the water and sewer claims as 
the rates established by City ordinance and PWSA 
resolution; thus, NTF contends that the rates are"filed with 
or regulated by" the government entities. NTF further 
contends that the Purchase Agreements and Servicing 
Agreements between the government entities and NTF and 
CARC have imposed tight governmental "oversight" over 
NTF 's and CARC's conduct. 
 
The district court held that the exemption is not 
applicable: 
 
        Defendants argue that . . . when a debt arises from 
       public utility services, it cannot constitute consumer 
       credit. We disagree. While we recognize that a public 
       utility is exempt from TILA disclosures upon extending 
       credit to a debtor for utility services, the exemption is 
       applicable only if the charges are filed [with] or 
       regulated by a governmental unit. 
 
        In the instant case, as we have established, the 
       payment plans offered by defendants constituted a new 
       extension of credit. This new extension was made well 
       after the liens and claims were acquired by National 
       Tax [NTF]. Defendants cannot claim reliance on the 
       public utility exemption, despite the fact that the 
       nature of the utility claims and liens have not changed 
       in essence by the assignment to National Tax. The 
       distinction here is that utilities are overseen and 
       regulated by a governmental unit to which National 
       Tax is not subject. 
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        The credit charges assessed by National Tax are not 
       `filed with or regulated by any government unit,' as 
       required under Regulation Z. While defendants argue 
       that the City and relevant authorities approved all 
       payment plans and charges, this type of contractual 
       relationship is too tenuous to constitute the 
       governmental unit regulation required for the 
       exemption. 
 
Pollice, 59 F. Supp.2d at 490 (footnote omitted). 
 
We agree with the district court that the public utility 
exemption is not applicable. It is true that 12 C.F.R. 
S 226.3(c) does not contain an explicit requirement that the 
credit be extended by a public utility; the extension of 
credit must simply "involve[ ] public utility services." 
Nevertheless, we believe that Congress and the Board 
intended the exemption to apply only to public utilities-- 
entities which are highly regulated by the government. See 
66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1301 et seq. (regulating public 
utility rates and rate-making). Although NTF is an assignee 
of claims arising from public utility services, and thereby 
stands in the shoes of the assignors, we reject its attempt 
to invoke the public utility exemption. 
 
4. Summary of conclusions regarding TILA claim 
 
We will affirm the dismissal of the Pollice plaintiffs' TILA 
claim as it relates to the tax obligations. We further 
conclude that the court did not err in holding that NTF is 
a TILA creditor, nor did it err in holding the public utility 
exemption inapplicable. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the aforesaid, we will affirm in part and will 
reverse in part. We will remand the case to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.42 
The parties will bear their own costs on these appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. In addition, we will dismiss the appeal at No. 99-3998. See n. 21, 
supra. 
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OBERDORFER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I fully agree with Judge Greenberg's masterful analysis of 
this very complex matter with one exception. I would also 
reverse and remand the district court's grant of defendants' 
motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim of the 
Houck plaintiffs under Pennsylvania's Loan Interest 
Protection Law ("LIPL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, S 101 et seq. 
See majority op. Part III.A.3. I am persuaded that if 
homeowners who agreed to payment plans assumed a 
personal liability in addition to any imposed incident to an 
original lien in rem, those homeowners have by those 
agreements given the creditor valuable additional 
consideration to forbear collection. If the payment plans 
created an additional personal liability, that liability 
imposed a detriment on the debtor by exposure of any free 
assets, future earnings and expectancies to the risk of a 
judgment, and reciprocally enhanced the value of the 
creditor's claim. The addition of this value to the creditor's 
claim together with the pre-existing interest obligation of 
the Houck payment plan participants could be in 
consideration "for the . . . use of money" within the 
meaning of the LIPL. As the Court has noted, 
 
       If a creditor who collects [damages for detention, as 
       distinguished from forbearance] agrees to forbear 
       without imposing greater charges, then the post- 
       forbearance charges are still in effect charges for 
       detention . . . . The situation is fundamentally different 
       where a new or higher rate is charged in connection 
       with the forbearance. 
 
Maj. op. note 18. 
 
My colleagues "do not question the proposition that non- 
monetary as well as monetary consideration may be taken 
into account in determining if a creditor has extracted an 
unlawful amount of value in return for a . . . forbearance." 
Maj. op. p. 28. They conclude, however, that 
 
       the interest and penalties paid by those who entered 
       into payment plans have not been paid as 
       consideration for NTF 's forbearance, . . . regardless of 
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       the fact that other things of value . . . may have been 
       given as consideration. 
 
Maj. op. p. 28. 
 
I do not believe that the present record supports this 
conclusion. Indeed, it is undisputed that payment plan 
participants assumed a new obligation to pay attorneys' 
fees. In addition, there is a fact dispute as to whether they 
also assumed a personal liability. See maj. op. note 19. 
Most important, whether or not the parties intended any 
non-monetary thing of value to be consideration for 
forbearance by the creditor is a quintessential question of 
fact to be resolved in the first instance by a trier of fact. 
 
Accordingly, I would also reverse and remand the district 
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the claim of 
the Houck plaintiffs under "LIPL." To this limited extent, I 
respectfully dissent. 
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